Philosophy & Individual Ethics
Vol. —, 2026

Creating individuality, which creates and protects others' individualities is good: The Core of Zaman Ali’s Philosophy

On a Claim in Zaman Ali's *MORALITY An Individual Dilemma* (2023)

Abstract

Zaman Ali's MORALITY (2023) concludes with an ethical claim that is structurally unusual: "Creating individuality, which creates and protects others' individualities is good." This article examines the claim on its own terms. It argues that the claim's philosophical interest lies not in what it commands but in what it refuses to command — and that its derivation, which proceeds not from truth but from what Ali calls considered truth, represents a coherent response to a genuine problem in moral philosophy: how to ground an ethical conclusion when objective moral foundations are unavailable. The article traces the internal logic of the claim, examines its reciprocal structure, and identifies both its achievement and its honest limit as Ali himself presents it.

I. An Unusual Ethical Claim

Most ethical conclusions in the Western philosophical tradition are stated as obligations, prohibitions, or principles of maximization. Do this. Do not do that. Produce the greatest good. Treat humanity as an end. Comply with the categorical form of the moral law. The claim under examination departs from each of these forms. It does not say: do this. It says: this kind of individuality is good.

The distinction is not stylistic. It is structural. An obligation is addressed to an agent who must comply. A claim about what kind of individuality is good is addressed to anyone asking what kind of being to be — and it answers not by issuing instructions but by identifying a direction. The agent is not commanded toward an outcome. A kind of existence is identified as better than others.

This matters for understanding what kind of philosophical claim MORALITY's conclusion is. Zaman Ali's book works through eight chapters — on what matters if not truth, on the defining line between individual and social obligation, on the formulation of an absolute, on individual responsibility, compromise, the tension between individual and social order, the problem of the good itself, and finally the Judgment Dilemma. Each chapter is a layer of clearing: removing the foundations that cannot support an ethical conclusion honestly, until what remains is the minimum on which a conclusion can actually stand. The sentence that concludes this process — "Creating individuality, which creates and protects others' individualities is good" — is the minimum that survives.

II. The Problem MORALITY Is Solving

To understand what the claim achieves, one must understand the problem it is responding to. MORALITY opens with an observation that is the starting point of the entire ethical inquiry: truth is irrelevant to living. The argument is developed carefully. Individuals throughout history have lived well on the basis of beliefs that were false. The living well did not depend on the beliefs being true. If truth were what mattered for living, this would be impossible. Since it is not impossible, something other than truth must be what matters.

What fills the gap is what Ali calls considered truth — the ideas, values, and standards that people consider true and live by, regardless of their actual truth status. The observation is stated directly in MORALITY:

> *Without the evidently known truth, but through the considered truth any idea could define a basic definition of being right and wrong.*

And its consequence:

> *This whole exercise replaced truth with considered truth and then truth become irrelevant because it is replaced by different consideration.*

Considered truth is not proposed as a satisfying substitute for actual truth. It is identified as a description of what is actually happening — what moral standards are actually built on in every society and in every individual life. The philosophical implication is severe:

if moral standards rest on considered truth rather than actual truth, then any ethical conclusion stated as if it rested on objective foundations is making a claim it cannot support. MORALITY's project is to derive an ethical conclusion that is honest about this condition — one that does not pretend to rest on foundations it does not have.

This is why the back cover of MORALITY does not begin with an answer. It begins with a question about power:

> *The problem isn't not only with what's right and wrong but the problem is with who decides about what's right and wrong.*

The question of who decides is prior to the question of what is right. Any ethical system that skips to conclusions without addressing the prior question has not solved the problem — it has simply occupied the position of the one who decides, without acknowledging that it has done so. MORALITY works through this problem before arriving at its conclusion. The sentence that concludes the book is therefore not an assertion of what is right by one who has claimed the authority to decide. It is a conclusion derived from what cannot be denied, under the epistemological conditions actually available.

III. The Claim's Internal Logic

The claim has three components that must be read together: creating individuality, which creates and protects others' individualities, is good. Each component is load-bearing.

"Creating individuality" names a specific mode of existing. Not merely existing — having an individuality by default. Creating it: actively forming one's own purposes, examining one's own considered truth, living from one's own mind rather than from roles and identities assigned by others. The claim is not about individuals as given facts but about the kind of individuals who generate their own particular existence rather than receiving it. The distinction is between formal individuality — which everyone possesses — and genuine individuality, which requires intellectual activity to sustain.

"Which creates and protects others' individualities" specifies the kind of creating individuality the claim is about. This is not altruistic language. It is not saying: sacrifice your individuality for others. It is identifying a property that distinguishes one kind of

individuality from another. An individuality that creates and protects others' individualities is structurally different from one that destroys, controls, or manufactures them. The claim evaluates the type, not the act.

"Is good" is the conclusion — not a normative imposition from outside the argument but a conclusion derived from within it. The derivation runs from the observation that individuality cannot be coherently denied: any denial requires a mind, a mind is an individual existence, and the act of denial reconstitutes what it is trying to eliminate. If individuality cannot be denied for one, it cannot be denied for any. Multiple individualities therefore all have equal status as things that cannot be denied. The individuality that destroys others' individualities acts against the logical consequences of this for all minds simultaneously. The individuality that creates and protects others' acts in accordance with them. Better and worse follow from this internal logic — not from an external moral standard imported into the argument.

The comparison with the two dominant Western traditions clarifies what is philosophically distinctive here. Kant's categorical imperative derives its conclusions by applying a universalizability test: act only on maxims you could will to be universal laws. The test works, but it requires the prior commitment to universalizability as a moral criterion — a commitment Kant assumes rather than derives. Consequentialism derives conclusions by calculating outcomes — but it requires the prior commitment to welfare or preference satisfaction as the thing to be maximized. Ali's derivation requires neither prior commitment. It requires only the denial argument's minimum — individuality cannot be coherently denied — and derives the ethical direction from the logical consequences of multiple such individualities coexisting. The assumption is smaller. The derivation is tighter. The conclusion is less precise about specific actions but more honest about what it assumes.

IV. What the Claim Refuses

An ethical conclusion defines itself partly by what it rules out. Three exclusions follow from the logic of the claim and are worth making explicit.

The first is the individuality that destroys others. This is the straightforward case — an individuality that eliminates others' individualities acts directly against what the foundation commits to for all minds. The claim does not spend its energy on this case. The harder cases are those in which destruction is not direct.

The second is the individuality that enforces equality upon others. MORALITY is explicit:

> *Whoever enforces equality itself brings inequality.*

The enforcer stands above those whose equality is being enforced by the structural logic of enforcement itself. The claim rules out not only the individuality that destroys others but the individuality that manages others toward good outcomes they have not chosen. Creating and protecting others' individualities means preserving their capacity to create their own — which requires their own agency, not someone else's administration of it. The paternalistic individuality fails the claim even when it is well-intentioned, because it substitutes its own judgment for others' rather than protecting the conditions under which others can exercise theirs.

The third exclusion follows from MORALITY's analysis of considered truth. An individuality that manufactures others' considered truth — that shapes what others take to be their own moral and political judgments without their awareness — does not destroy individuality visibly. It preserves its external appearance while removing its substance: the intellectual capacity to examine one's own considered truth and arrive at one's own honest minimum. This is a violation of the claim as direct as physical destruction, and more insidious because it is invisible from the inside. The claim rules it out precisely because the claim's whole project is to protect the examined individual — the one who decides by thinking, not by receiving.

V. The Honest Limit

MORALITY does not end with the ethical conclusion. It ends with the Judgment Dilemma — and this is philosophically significant. The claim provides direction, not resolution. When two individualities conflict directly — each claiming the protection that

the foundation extends to all individualities — the claim establishes that protecting individuality is better than destroying it, but does not establish which individuality takes precedence when two valid claims conflict. The system marks this limit explicitly and does not paper over it with a higher principle.

This is consistent with the epistemological honesty that runs through the book. MORALITY's claim about considered truth commits the system to the same honesty about its own conclusions: they rest on a foundation that is argued to be the honest minimum, not on a foundation that is proven. The claim is as robust as the denial argument — and the denial argument is stated, throughout the system, as the minimum that cannot be coherently attacked, not as an ultimate proof. The conclusion is offered in the same spirit: the minimum that follows from what cannot be denied, under the conditions that actually obtain for human knowledge.

The back cover of MORALITY states the question that lies beneath the conclusion and that the conclusion is designed to serve:

> *can the question itself be protected or not? And for us the question itself belongs with our own individuality and provides reasons to questions and understanding, that's why protecting it becomes necessary.*

The questioning individual — the one who examines rather than receives, who arrives at considered truth through honest inquiry rather than accepting manufactured foundations — is the subject the claim is ultimately about. Creating and protecting others' individualities is, at this level, creating and protecting others' capacity to question. The claim describes what is good. But it can only be genuinely held by someone who has examined it — which means that engaging with the claim honestly is itself an instance of the kind of individuality the claim describes as good. The form of receiving it correctly enacts the content it asserts.

VI. Conclusion

"Creating individuality, which creates and protects others' individualities is good" is not a simple moral aphorism. It is a conclusion derived from a precise philosophical argument

about what can be ethically claimed when objective moral foundations are unavailable. Its derivation proceeds through the observation that considered truth replaces actual truth in moral life, through the denial argument that individuality cannot be coherently eliminated as a foundation, and through the logical consequences of multiple individualities coexisting under that condition. The conclusion is less specific than Kant's imperative in what it prescribes about particular actions. It is more honest about what it assumes.

Its exclusions are as important as its assertion: the individuality that destroys others, the individuality that administers others toward good outcomes, and the individuality that manufactures others' considered truth are all ruled out by the same logic that grounds the claim. Each of these represents a way of failing the condition the claim identifies as good, and each is a recognizable failure mode in political and moral life — which suggests the claim is tracking something real rather than constructing an abstract ideal.

Its honest limit — the Judgment Dilemma, the unresolved conflict between two valid individual claims — is presented not as a flaw but as the accurate marking of where the argument ends. A claim that acknowledges what it cannot resolve is more philosophically trustworthy than one that papers over its limits with principles it has not earned.

What the claim ultimately protects is the questioning individual. The one for whom knowing the way to live requires examining, not receiving. MORALITY's conclusion is offered to that individual — not as a commandment, but as the honest minimum derivable from what cannot be denied, by someone who has done the examining and found it does not collapse.

Notes

All quotations from Zaman Ali are taken from MORALITY: An Individual Dilemma (2023), self-published, Lahore, Pakistan. LCCN: 2022915258. ISBN: 978-969-23195-5-3.

The denial argument referenced in sections III and V runs throughout Ali's system from HUMANITY (2017) onward. It is the ontological foundation on which MORALITY's ethical derivation rests, but the derivation itself is conducted entirely within MORALITY.

The comparison with Kant's categorical imperative in section III is the author's analytic framing, not a claim made by Ali in MORALITY, which does not reference Kant.

Bibliography

Works: HUMANITY (2017, ISBN 978-969-23195-0-8, LCCN JC330.15.Z34 2017) · ZAMANISM (2019, ISBN 978-969-23195-2-2) · GOVERNMENT (2020, ISBN 978-969-23195-3-9, LCCN 2020915232) · EVIDENCE (2022, ISBN 978-969-23195-4-6, LCCN 2022900141) · MORALITY (2023, ISBN 978-969-23195-5-3, LCCN 2022915258) · All published by Zaman Ali, Lahore, Pakistan · · ORCID: 0000-0002-0597-5718 LCCN: 2019148652 VIAF: 350415510577407632000 2 OCLC: E39PCjHkyFrMGKtHBg3JBqCyBd OCLC Book: 1407032845 LCCN book 2022289749 ISNI: 000000047407140X OPL: OL7406101A PhilPapers: Zaman Ali

---

This article may be reproduced for scholarly purposes with full attribution.